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In this paper, I build a model marketplace populated by a ﬁnite number of sellers–
each producing its own variety of the good–and a continuum of buyers–each searching
for a variety he likes. Using the model, I study the response of a seller’s price to privately
observed ﬂuctuations in its idiosyncratic production cost. I ﬁnd that the qualitative
properties of this response critically depend on the persistence of the production cost.
In particular, if the cost is i.i.d., the seller’s price does not respond at all. If the
cost is somewhat persistent, the seller’s price responds slowly and incompletely. If the
cost is very persistent, the seller’s price adjusts instantaneously and eﬃciently to all
ﬂuctuations in productivity. I argue that these ﬁndings can explain why the monthly
frequency of a price change is so much lower for processed than for raw goods.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The frequency at which prices change varies dramatically across goods. For some goods
such as potatoes, gasoline and airfares, the monthly frequency of a price change is higher
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1than ﬁfty percent. For other goods like restaurant meals, haircuts or concerts, the monthly
frequency of a price adjustment is below ten percent. In front of such ﬁgures, it is natural to
wonder how much of the diﬀerence in the frequency of price adjustment can be explained by
diﬀerences in various characteristics of the goods. Using previously unpublished data from
the BLS, Bils and Klenow (2004) ﬁnd that the single most important explanatory variable
is whether a good is raw or processed. Indeed, the monthly frequency of a price change is 34
percent higher if the good is raw than if it is processed.
What’s so diﬀerent about raw and processed goods? For one thing, in many markets for
processed goods, each producer makes its own variety of the good and each buyer spends
some time searching for one variety that he likes. On the contrary, in many of the markets for
raw goods, once a buyer ﬁnds a variety he likes, he can purchase it from a number of diﬀerent
producers. In this paper, I ask whether this diﬀerence alone can qualitatively explain the
diﬀerence in the frequency of price adjustment between these two classes of goods.
In order to answer this question, I build a model of the typical market for processed
goods. Speciﬁcally, I consider a marketplace populated by a ﬁnite number of sellers–each
producing its own variety of the good–and a continuum of buyers–each demanding at most
one unit of the good per period. In this market, a buyer does not know whether he likes
the variety produced by a certain seller unless he spends some time researching it. Using
this model, I characterize the response of a seller’s price to changes in the cost of producing
its own variety and compare it with the equilibrium price dynamics that would emerge in a
Walrasian market (the natural model for the raw goods market). The analysis is carried out
under the assumption that–perhaps because of reputation concerns–a seller can credibly
commit to a complete contingent price schedule which maps public histories into terms of
trade.
As a preliminary step, I characterize the optimal price schedule when the seller’s cost of
production is public information. I ﬁn dt h a tt h es c h e d u l ei st i m ei n c o n s i s t e n t ,i . e .a f t e ra n y
history, it prescribes a price lower than the one that would maximize the seller’s continuation
proﬁts. In addition, I ﬁnd that the schedule is cost sensitive, i.e. after any history, it pre-
scribes a higher price the higher is the contemporaneous realization of the cost of production.
Intuitively, the schedule is time inconsistent because the seller obtains part of the beneﬁt
from charging a lower price at date t in advance (namely, through the increase in the number
of buyers who search its variety in periods 1,2,...t−1) ,b u ti tb e a r st h ec o s te n t i r e l ya td a t et.
Intuitively, the schedule is cost sensitive because the seller beneﬁts more from investing in its
customer base when the productivity is higher. Taken together, these two properties imply
that the optimal price schedule would typically be non incentive-compatible if the seller had
2private information about its idiosyncratic cost of production. In particular, the seller would
have the incentive to overreport the realization of its cost in order to extract some more rents
from the customer base.
In the second part of the paper, I consider the more realistic case where the seller privately
observe its idiosyncratic cost of production. I ﬁnd that the qualitative properties of the
optimal incentive-compatible schedule critically depend on the persistence of the seller’s
cost. In particular, if the cost is i.i.d. over time, the schedule prescribes rigid prices–i.e.
the terms of trade do not change in response to ﬂuctuations in the seller’s productivity. If
the cost is somewhat persistent, the schedule prescribes sticky prices–i.e. the terms of trade
adjust slowly and incompletely (as compared to the symmetric information case) in response
to changes in the seller’s cost of production. Finally, if the cost is very persistent, the optimal
price schedule is the same under symmetric and asymmetric information.
In order to develop some intuition about these ﬁndings, consider a seller that has realized
a relatively low cost of production and entertains the idea of lying and announcing a higher
cost. On the one hand, if it misreports its type, the seller can charge a higher price to
its customers. Because of the time inconsistent nature of the pricing problem, this eﬀect
increases the seller’s proﬁts. On the other hand, if it misreports its type, the seller induces the
market to form irrationally pessimistic expectations about future costs and prices. Obviously,
this eﬀe c tl o w e r st h es e l l e r ’ sp r o ﬁts. When the cost of production is i.i.d. over time, the
second eﬀect is mute and the seller correctly reports its type only if it can charge the same
price independently from its productivity. When the cost is somewhat persistent, the second
eﬀect is active and the low-cost seller correctly reports its type as long as prices are not
too responsive to productivity. Finally, when the cost is very persistent, the second eﬀect
is so strong that the optimal price schedule under symmetric information becomes incentive
compatible.
In light of these results, I conclude that sellers making their own variety of the good and
buyers having to search for one variety they like are deﬁning characteristics of the processed
goods market which–in some cases–are alone suﬃcient to explain why prices adjust less
frequently than in the market for raw goods.
Related Literature. My paper contributes to the theoretical literature on price rigidity. In
models of time-dependent pricing (Calvo 1983, Taylor 1980), it is assumed that–for whatever
reason–a seller cannot change its price in every period. Obviously, this assumption implies
that sometimes a seller’s price does not adjust in response to a change in fundamentals. In
models of state-dependent pricing (Caplin and Spulber 1987, Golosov and Lucas 2007), it is
3assumed that a seller has to pay a ﬁxed menu cost in order to change its price. Obviously,
this assumption implies that a seller’s price doesn’t adjust in response to suﬃciently small
changes in fundamentals. My theory of price rigidity diﬀers from these in two respects.
First, according to my theory, adjustment costs are not necessary to explain why prices
remain constant in the face of real changes in fundamentals. Secondly, according to my
theory, there is no reason why prices should not adjust to nominal changes in fundamentals.
Given these fundamental diﬀerences, I see my paper more as a complement than a substitute
for menu costs and staggered pricing.
A closer substitute to my paper is Athey, Bagwell and Sanchirico (2004), where another
theory of real rigidities is advanced. Speciﬁcally, they show that–under certain conditions–
an optimal collusion scheme requires sellers to keep their price constant in the face of privately
observed ﬂuctuations in their idiosyncratic cost of production. Whether their theory is more
useful than mine for understanding the diﬀerence in the frequency of price adjustment across
g o o d si sa no p e nq u e s t i o n .
Secondly, my paper contributes to the literature on pricing in markets with search fric-
tions. Diamond (1971) considers a product market where buyers have to search a seller in
order to ﬁnd out its price. In such a market, the price has only the role of distributing the
gains form trade between the seller and the buyers who have matched with it. Therefore,
no matter how small search frictions are, every seller charges the pure monopoly price. On
the other hand, Montgomery (1991), Moen (1997) and Burdett Shi Wright (2001) consider a
static product market where buyers can observe the sellers’ prices before they decide where
to search. Because of frictions, not every buyer who searches a seller gets served. In such a
m a r k e t ,t h ep r i c eh a st h er o l eo fallocating the buyers’ search eﬀort across sellers. Therefore,
in equilibrium, sellers charge a price that is typically lower than the monopoly level.
In this paper, I consider a dynamic product market in which buyers can observe the
seller’s current and future prices before they decide where to search. In such a market, the
seller’s price at date t allocates the buyers’ search eﬀort in periods 1,2,...t and distributes
the gains from trade in period t. Therefore, as time passes, the price becomes progressively
less allocative and more distributive and the seller would like to renege on its promise. In
the context of the Burdett Mortensen (1998) model, Coles (2001) had already recognized
this type of time inconsistency. Yet, I am the ﬁrst to realize that time inconsistency creates
an incentive problem when the seller has private information about its time-varying cost of
production. Moreover, I am the ﬁrst to characterize the qualitative properties of the solution
to this incentive problem.
4Finally, my paper relates to the literature on pricing in markets where customers face
a ﬁxed cost of switching from one seller to another (see Klemperer 1987, 1995 and Beggs
Klemperer 1992). In fact, also in these markets, the seller’s price has both an allocative
and a distributive role. And also in these markets, the seller’s problem is time inconsistent
because the allocative role becomes progressively less important relatively to the distributive
role. Yet, because this literature works with the assumption that sellers cannot precommit
to future prices, it has never encountered the kind of incentive problem that is central to my
paper.
Structure of the Paper. In Section 2, I describe the physical environment. In Section
3, I formulate the seller’s problem when productivity shocks are perfectly observable and
characterize the ﬁrst-best price schedule. In Section 4, I begin by formulating the pricing
problem when productivity shocks are privately observed by the seller. Then, I identify
a condition on the persistence of productivity shocks which guarantees that the ﬁrst-best
schedule is incentive compatible under asymmetric information. Finally, I characterize the
qualitative properties of the second-best price schedule when the incentive compatibility
constraints are binding. Section 5 brieﬂy concludes. All proofs are relegated in the Appendix.
2T h e E n v i r o n m e n t
The market for an indivisible and perishable consumption good is populated by a ﬁnite
number of sellers and a continuum of buyers with large measure. In period t each seller
i can produce its variety of the good at the constant marginal cost ci,t.T h i s c o s t i s a n
idiosyncratic random variable that can take either the relatively low value c  or the relatively
high value ch, 0 <c   <c h. The probability of each realization depends on the seller’s past
productivity–namely, Pr(ci,t+1 = ci,t)=ρ ≥ 1
2. T h es e l l e rm a x i m i z e st h ee x p e c t e ds u mo f
proﬁts discounted at rate β ∈ (0,1). In period t, each buyer j can participate to the market
by paying an opportunity cost of z>0 utils. If the buyer decides to visit the market, ﬁnds a
variety that he likes and purchases one unit of it at the price pj,t, he receives the periodical
utility u − pj,t, u ∈ (z + ch,∞). If the buyer visits the market and doesn’t purchase the
good, his periodical utility is normalized to zero. The buyer maximizes the expected sum of
utilities discounted at rate β.
Buyers and sellers come together through a search and matching process. If buyer j
searches seller i, the two parties match successfully (i.e. the buyer likes the seller’s variety)
with probability λi,t and fail to match with probability 1 − λi,t.I nt h eﬁrst case, the buyer
has the option to purchase one unit of the good from the seller in the current period and,
5as long as the match survives, in future periods. In the second case, the buyer does not
trade in the current period and has to search for a seller in the next period. Because of
congestion eﬀects, I assume that the probability λi,t is a decreasing function of the measure
qi,t of buyers searching seller i in period t. Because of network eﬀects, I assume that the
probability λi,t is an increasing function of the measure ni,t of buyers who purchased from
seller i in period t−1. For the sake of analytical tractability, I assume that λi,t only depends
on the ratio between qi,t and ni,t. In particular, the function λ maps Rt into [0,1] and is such
that λ
0 (q/n) < 0,λ (0) = 1 and λ(∞)=0 . A match dissolves if the buyer is exogenously
displaced from the market (an event that occurs with probability σ ∈ (0,1) in each period),
if he voluntarily decides to leave the seller to search elsewhere or if he stops actively trading
with the seller.1
In period t, events unfold in four stages. In the ﬁrst stage, each seller realizes its pro-
ductivity shock and publishes its terms of trade. Moreover, existing matches are subject
to the displacement shock. In the second stage, buyers observe the entire distribution of
terms of trade. Based on this information, matched buyers decide whether to remain with
their current provider, search elsewhere or leave the market altogether. Unmatched buyers
decide whether to visit the market and, if so, which seller to search. In the third stage, new
matches are formed. In the fourth and ﬁnal stage, matched buyers demand the good and
sellers produce it. Throughout the paper, I assume that sellers cannot price discriminate
because buyers are anonymous.
3 Pricing with Publicly Observed Costs
The purpose of this paper is to formulate and solve the pricing problem of a seller that
enters the market in period t =0with the cost of production c0 and a base of customers of
measure n(c0) > 0. I assume that–perhaps because of reputational concerns–the seller can
pre-commit to a sequence of state-contingent prices p = {p(ht)}
∞
t=0,w h e r eht is the seller’s
public history up to date t. In this section, I also assume that the seller’s idiosyncratic cost
of production is publicly observed and therefore ht = ct = {c0,c 1,......ct}.
3.1 Seller’s Problem
Denote with U (ct) the expected lifetime utility for a buyer who is matched with the seller
in period t,a f t e rt h eh i s t o r yct has been realized. In period t, the buyer trades with the
1This no recall assumption is typical in search theory because it greatly simpliﬁes the dynamics of the
buyers’ problem (cf Burdett and Mortensen (1998), Burdett and Coles (2003), Fishman and Rob (1995)).
6seller and receives the periodical utility u − p(ct). With probability 1 − σ,i np e r i o dt +1
the buyer has the option of remaining matched to the seller and receiving the continuation
utility U(ct+1) or searching some other seller/market and receiving the continuation utility
Z. With probability σ,i np e r i o dt +1the buyer is exogenously displaced from the market













Notice that Z is greater than (1−β)−1z because the buyer is free to stay out of the market.
Also, Z is smaller than (1 − β)−1z because, at this value, the entry of new buyers in the
market is inﬁnitely elastic. Therefore, Z is equal to the present value of the ﬂow cost of entry
z.
Next, consider a buyer who decides to search the seller in period t,a f t e rt h eh i s t o r yct
has been realized. With probability λ(q(ct)/n(ct)), the buyer matches successfully with the
seller and receives the expected lifetime utility U(ct). With probability 1 − λ(q(ct)/n(ct)),
the buyer does not match with the seller and receives the lifetime utility βZ. In expectation,
the value of searching the seller in period t is smaller than Z–because buyers are free to
enter the market and search any particular seller they like–and is greater than Z whenever
q(ct) > 0–because those q(ct) buyers are free to search elsewhere. Therefore, in equilibrium,












− βZ]+βZ ≤ Z (2)
and q (ct) ≥ 0 with complementary slackness condition. It is convenient to denote with
θ(U(ct)) the ratio of buyers searching the seller q(ct) to old customers n(ct) that solves the
equilibrium condition (2).
If the value U(ct) of being matched to the seller is smaller than the outside option Z,
every single one of the n(ct) old customers leaves and no new customers arrive. If U(ct) is
greater than Z, a fraction 1−σ of the seller’s n(ct) old customers returns and n(ct)·θ(U(ct))·
λ(θ(U(ct))) new customers arrive. Overall, the law of motion for the seller’s customer base
















where η : R → R is a function that takes the value σ−1 if U<Zand θ(U)·λ(θ(U)) otherwise.
Ia s s u m et h a tλ(θ) is such that the function η(U) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly
increasing and weakly concave and that η(∞) ≤ β
−1 − (1 − σ).2
2All these conditions on η(U) are satisﬁed if, for example, the function λ(θ) is equal to (1 + αθγ)−1/γ,
where γ lies between [0,1] and α is strictly positive.
7In period t =0 , the seller commits to the price schedule p that maximizes the expected










Pr(ct|c0)n(ct)[1 − σ + η(U(ct))][p(ct) − ct]
¸
,s . t .
(1), (3) and c0,n (c0) given.
(SP1)
The sequence problem (SP1) has two remarkable properties. First, after any history ct,
the optimal schedule p maximizes the seller’s continuation proﬁts subject to providing the
buyers’ at least the lifetime utility U(ct). Secondly, after any history ct, the price schedule
that maximizes the seller’s continuation proﬁts subject to providing the buyers with U(ct)
is independent from the customer base n(ct) and the maximized proﬁts are proportional
to n(ct). In the Appendix, I use these two properties to prove that the sequence problem
(SP1) has an equivalent recursive-form representation. In the recursive problem, the state
variables are the seller’s cost of production ci and the buyers’ promised value U.T h ec h o i c e
variables are the value V actually delivered to the buyers, V ≥ U, the current price p and
next period’s promised values U0
j, j = { ,h}. The objective function is the sum of current
proﬁts (1−σ+η(V ))·(p−ci) a n dd i s c o u n t e df u t u r ep r o ﬁts (1−σ+η(V ))·β·E[Πj(U0
j)|ci].
Lemma 1: (Recursive Formulation) Denote with Πi(U) the value function associated to the
sequence problem (SP1) when c0 = ci, n(c0)=1and U(c0) i sc o n s t r a i n e dt ob eg r e a t e ro r
equal than U.T h e nΠi(U) is the unique solution to the Bellman equation
Πi(U)= m a x
p,V,U0
j≥Z
(1 − σ + η(V ))
h





,s . t .










i|j(U)} be the policy functions associated to the Bellman equation above.
Then, for all histories ct = {ct−2,c i,c j}, the optimal price schedule is such that p(ct) is equal
to pj(˜ U(ct)),w h e r e ˜ U(ct)=U0
j|i(˜ U(ct−1)) and ˜ U(c0)=Z.
3.2 First-Best Price Schedule




(1 − σ + η(V )) · πi(V ),












8In the ﬁrst stage, the seller decides how much lifetime utility V i t sc u s t o m e r ss h o u l db e
oﬀered subject to the promise-keeping constraint V ≥ U. In the second stage, the seller
decides how the lifetime utility V should be allocated over time and across states.
How much lifetime utility should the seller oﬀer to its customers? If V is smaller than the
outside option Z, the seller does not have any customers and its proﬁts are equal to zero. If
V is greater than Z, the seller has 1−σ+η(V ) customers and obtains the proﬁt πi(V ) from
each one of them. Over this region, the seller’s total proﬁts (1 − σ + η(V ))· πi(V ) are ﬁrst
positive and increasing and then decreasing in the lifetime utility V . They are maximized at
Ui, where the beneﬁto fa t t r a c t i n gη0(Ui) additional new customers is equal to the cost of
lowering the current price by 1 dollar, i.e.
η0(Ui) · πi(Ui)=1− σ + η(Ui) (5)
The seller’s oﬀer is subject to the promise-keeping constraint V ≥ U.I fU is lower than Ui,
the constraint is moot and the seller oﬀers the proﬁt-maximizing value Ui.I f U is greater
than Ui, the constraint binds and the seller oﬀers its customers the value it had promised
them.
How should the seller allocate the buyers’ lifetime utility V over time and across states?
The seller can backload any feasible allocation by reducing the utility u − p oﬀered to its
customers in the current period by Pr(cj|ci)β(1−σ) dollars and increasing their continuation
value U0
j by 1 dollar. Then, in the current period, the seller collects Pr(cj|ci)β(1 − σ)
extra dollars per unit of output sold. And, in the next period, it attracts η0(U0
j) additional
customers and lowers the price by 1 dollar. If the seller frontloads a feasible allocation, the
eﬀects on current and future proﬁt sh a v et h es a m em a g n i t u d ea n dt h eo p p o s i t es i g n . T h e
optimal allocation (u−p,U0
 ,U0
h) is such that the seller’s proﬁts cannot be increased by tilting
the timing of beneﬁts neither back nor forth, i.e.
−(1 − σ)=η0(U0
j) · πj(U0
j) − (1 − σ + η(U0
j)), for j =  ,h, (6)








Notice that, because an increase in U0
j by 1 util allows the seller to not only attract η0(U0
j) ad-
ditional customers in the next period but also raise its current price, the optimal continuation
value U0
j is greater than Uj.
Using the solution to the ﬁrst and second stage problems, I can recover the structure of
the ﬁrst-best price schedule p and its qualitative properties. In period t =0 ,t h es e l l e re n t e r s
the market with no prior obligations, U(c0)=Z, and the production cost c0 = ci. The seller
9oﬀers its customers the proﬁt-maximizing lifetime utility Ui by setting the current period’s
price to p(Ui) and committing to the continuation values (U0
 ,U0
h).I n p e r i o d t ≥ 1,a f t e r
the history ct has been realized, the seller has the production cost ct = cj and an obligation
to deliver its customers at least U0
j. The seller oﬀers them the promised lifetime utility U0
j
by setting the current period’s price to p(U0




i is greater than Ui, prices are decreasing over time. Also, because U 
is greater than Uh and U0
  is greater than U0
h, prices are increasing in the contemporaneous
realization of the cost of production.
Proposition 1: (Pricing with Publicly Observed Costs). When the seller’s idiosyncratic
cost of production is publicly observed, the optimal price schedule p = {p(ct)}
∞
t=0 prescribes
the price p(c0)=p(Ui) for c0 = ci and the price p(ct)=p(U0
i) for t ≥ 1 and ct =
{ct−1,c i}. Keeping the cost of production constant, the prescribed prices are decreasing over
time: p(ct) <p (c0) for t ≥ 1, ct = {ct−1,c i} and c0 = ci. Keeping the calendar date






1 ,c h} and ct
2 = {c
t−1
2 ,c  }.
The ﬁrst-best price schedule characterized in Proposition 1 is time-inconsistent.A td a t e
t =0 ,t h es e l l e rﬁnds optimal to charge its customers the high price p(Ui) and promise
them the low price p(U0
i) for the subsequent period. When date t =1arrives, the seller has
already obtained part of the beneﬁto fp r o m i s i n gp(U0
i)–i.e. the increase in the inﬂow of
new customers at t =0 –but has still to bear its entire cost. Then, the seller would like to
renege the original schedule and, once again, charge its customers the high price p(Ui) and
promise them the low price p(U0
i) in the future.
4 Pricing with Privately Observed Costs
Consider a seller that enters the market in period t =0with the cost of production c0 and
ac u s t o m e rb a s eo fm e a s u r en(c0) > 0. Assume that the seller can commit to a sequence
of state-contingent prices p = {p(ht)}∞
t=0,w h e r eht is the seller’s public history up to date
t. Assume that, in every period t ≥ 1, the seller privately observes the realization of its
cost of production ct and makes a public announcement b ct ∈ {c ,c h} about it. Hence, ht
is b ct = {c0,b c1,...b ct}. In this section, I formulate and solve the pricing problem of the seller
subject to the restriction that, after any history b ct, the customer’s beliefs about the cost of
production ct are degenerate.
104.1 Seller’s Problem
Without loss in generality, I can assume that the buyers interpret the seller’s reports as
truthful, i.e. Pr(ct =ˆ ct|b ct−1)=1 .D e n o t ew i t hU(b ct) the expected lifetime utility for a buyer
who is matched with the seller in period t, after the history of announcements b ct = {b ct−1,c j}
has been reported. In period t, the buyer trades with the seller and receives the periodical
utility u − p(b ct).I np e r i o dt +1 ,the buyer expects that the seller will report the production
cost cj and oﬀer him the continuation utility U({b ct,c j}) with probability ρ ≥ 1/2. The buyer
expects that the seller will report the production cost c−j and oﬀer him the continuation
utility U({b ct,c −j}) with probability 1 − ρ. Given those beliefs, U(b ct) is equal to
U(b ct)=u − p(b ct)+β
£P
e ct+1 Pr(b ct+1|b ct)[(1 − σ)max{U(b ct+1),Z} + σZ]
¤
.( 8 )
Along the equilibrium path, the seller’s reporting strategy must be consistent with the
buyers’ inference of the production cost ct from the announcement ˆ ct. Therefore, for all













cτ Pr(cτ|ct)n(b c(cτ))[1 − σ + η(U (b c(cτ)))][p(b c(cτ)) − cτ]},
(IC)
where b c(cτ) is the public history {ct−1,c −i,c t+1,...cτ}.I nw r i t i n gt h eincentive compatibility
constraint (IC), I have assumed that–independently from its period−t announcement–the
seller will ﬁnd optimal to report its type correctly in any subsequent period τ ≥ t.T h i si s
the right assumption to make because the seller’s expected proﬁts from reporting its true
type and from lying depend on the public history b cτ−1 and on the cost of production cτ but
not on the previous realizations of productivity shocks cτ−1. Therefore, the same incentive
compatibility constraint (IC) which guarantees that the seller will truthfully report cτ after
the history b cτ−1 has been realized and reported, also guarantees that the seller will truthfully
report cτ after the history b cτ−1 has been reported and some diﬀerent history has been realized.
In general, the optimal incentive-compatible price schedule p∗ need not be renegotiation
proof, i.e. there may exist some histories after which the seller and its customers would agree
to modifying p∗. In order to rule out this possibility, I restrict attention to price schedules p












cτ Pr(cτ|ct)n(cτ|ˆ p)[1 − σ + η(U (cτ|ˆ p))][ˆ p(cτ) − cτ]}.
(RP)
Notice that–because the value of a price schedule depends on the reported history b ct−1 and
on the production cost ct, but does not depend on the realized history ct−1–the renegotiation
proofness constraint (RP) guarantees that p is ex-post eﬃcient even if the seller has lied in
some previous period τ ≤ t − 1.
In period t =0 , the seller commits to the price schedule p that maximizes the expected









ct Pr(ct|c0)n(ct)[1 − σ + η(U(ct))][p(ct) − ct]},s . t .
(IC), (RP) and c0,n (c0) given.
(SP2)
The sequence problem (SP2) has two remarkable features. First, after any realized history ct
and reported history b ct, the optimal price schedule p satisﬁes (IC) and (RP) at all subsequent
dates τ ≥ t+1. And, among all the feasible schedules, p is the one that maximizes the proﬁts
of a seller with production cost ˆ ct subject to providing the buyers with a lifetime utility
non-smaller than U(b ct). Secondly, after any realized history ct and reported history b ct,t h e
feasible schedule that maximizes the seller’s proﬁts subject to providing the buyers with U(b ct)
is independent from the customer base n(ˆ ct) and the maximized proﬁts are proportional to
n(ˆ ct). Using these two properties, in the Appendix, I prove that the sequence problem (SP2)
has an equivalent recursive-form representation.
Lemma 2: (Recursive Formulation) Denote with Πi(U) the value function associated to the
sequence problem (SP2) when c0 = ci, n(c0)=1and U(c0) i sc o n s t r a i n e dt ob eg r e a t e ro r
equal than U.T h e nΠi(U) solves the Bellman equation
Πi(U)= m a x
p,V,U0
j≥Z
(1 − σ + η(V ))
h





,s . t .









j) ≥ ˜ Π−j(U0
−j) for j =  ,h,
˜ Πi(U)=( 1− σ + η(Vi(U)))
h







3The schedule ˆ p is feasible if it satisﬁes the incentive-compatibility constraint (IC) and the renegotiation-
proofness condition (RP) in all periods τ ≥ t +1 .
12Let {Vi(U),p i(U),U0
i|j(U)} be the policy functions associated to the solution Πi(U) of the
Bellman equation above. Then, for all histories ct = {ct−2,c i,c j}, the optimal price schedule
is such that p(ct) is equal to pj(˜ U(ct)),w h e r e ˜ U(ct)=U0
j|i(˜ U(ct−1)) and ˜ U(c0)=Z.
4.2 Very Persistent Costs: Fully Flexible Prices
When it satisﬁes the incentive compatibility and renegotiation proofness constraints, the
ﬁrst-best schedule is the solution to the pricing problem under asymmetric information.
Because the ﬁrst-best schedule is ex-post eﬃcient, the renegotiation proofness constraint
(RP) is certainly satisﬁed. But because the schedule is time-inconsistent, the incentive
compatibility constraint (IC) need not hold. In this subsection, I identify a necessary and
suﬃcient condition on the persistence of productivity shocks which guarantees that the ﬁrst-
best schedule will be incentive compatible. For the sake of simplicity, I carry out the analysis
under the assumption that η is approximately linear over the range of values promised by
the seller.
Imagine that the seller realizes the high cost of production ch after having announced the
history ˆ ct−1. If it chooses to report the low cost c  instead of ch, the seller lowers its price by
p(U0
h)−p(U0
 ) dollars and attracts η0(U0
  −U0
h) additional customers in period t. Because the
ﬁrst-best price schedule is history independent, the report ˆ ct does not aﬀect the dynamics of
prices and customers in subsequent periods. Therefore, the seller reports its actual cost of
production ch if and only if
Πh(U0
h) − ˜ Π (U0
 )=
{(1 − σ + η(U0
 ))[1 − β(1 − σ)(2ρ − 1)] − η0πh(U0
h)}(U0
  − U0
h)=
{(1 − σ)[1− β (1 − σ + η(U0
 ))(2ρ − 1)] + η0(U0
  − U0
h)}(U0
  − U0
h) ≥ 0
(9)
where the third line is obtained after substituting in the ﬁrst order condition (6). Analytically,
it is immediate to verify that the incentive compatibility constraint (9) is always satisﬁed.
Intuitively, the seller has no incentive to report c  instead of ch because this would imply
lowering a price that, from its perspective in period t,i sa l r e a d yt o ol o w .
Next, imagine that the seller realizes the low cost of production c  after having announced
the history ˆ ct−1. If it chooses to report the high cost ch instead of c , the seller increases
its price by p(U0
h) − p(U0
 ) dollars and attracts η0(U0
  − U0
h) fewer customers in period t.
The report ˆ ct does not aﬀect the dynamics of prices and customers in subsequent periods.
13Therefore, the seller reports its actual cost of production c  if and only if
Π (U0
 ) − ˜ Πh(U0
h)=
{η0π (U0
 ) − (1 − σ + η(U0
h))[1 − β (1 − σ)(2ρ − 1)]}(U0
  − U0
h)=
{η0(U0
  − U0
h) − (1 − σ)[1− β (1 − σ + η(U0
h))(2ρ − 1)]}(U0
  − U0
h) ≥ 0.
(10)
The incentive compatibility constraint (10) may be satisﬁed or violated depending on pa-
rameter values. In particular, there exists a critical level of persistence ρ∗ of the cost of
production such that the constraint (10) is satisﬁed if ρ is greater than ρ∗ and is violated if
ρ is below ρ∗. Intuitively, because the schedule is time inconsistent, the low cost seller would
like to raise the current price. But by reporting ch instead of c , the seller not only increases
the current price, it also makes customers irrationally pessimistic about the future terms of
trade. And this side eﬀect becomes stronger the more persistent costs of production are.




such that, for all ρ>
(<)ρ∗, the ﬁrst-best price schedule is feasible and optimal (not feasible) when the seller has
private information about its idiosyncratic cost of production.
4.3 IID Costs: Rigid Prices
When the persistence of productivity shocks is lower than the critical level ρ∗,t h eﬁrst-best
schedule violates the incentive compatibility constraint (IC). In order to characterize the




(1 − σ + η(V )) · πi(V ),












j) ≥ ˜ Πj(U0
j) for j ∈ { ,h}.
(11)
In the ﬁrst-stage problem, the choice variable is the customers’ lifetime utility V .T h e
objective function is the expected discounted proﬁt for a seller with the current cost of
production ci. The function is ﬁrst increasing and then decreasing in V and attains its
unique maximum at Ui,w h e r eUi is the solution to the equation (5). The choice of V is
limited by the promised-keeping constraint U ≤ V . Therefore, if U ≤ Ui, the solution to the
ﬁrst-stage problem is to provide customers with the proﬁt-maximizing value Ui.I fU>U i,
the solution is to provide customers with the promised value U.
14In the second-stage problem, the choice variables are the customers’ continuation values
U0
  and U0
h. The objective function is the proﬁt per customer for a seller that provides them
with the lifetime utility V . The function is quasi-concave in (U0
 ,U0
h) and attains its unique
maximum at (U0∗
  ,U0∗
h ),w h e r eU0∗
j is the solution to the equation (6). The choice of (U0
 ,U0
h)
is limited by the incentive-compatibility constraint Πj(U0
j) ≥ ˜ Π−j(U0
−j).B e c a u s e V enters
the objective function separately from the choice variables, the solution to the second-stage
problem is independent from the lifetime utility V and can be denoted with (U0
 |i,U0
h|i).
Because the objective function is increasing in U0
j and the constraint is independent from U0
j
for all U0
j ≤ Uj, the solution to the second-stage problem (U0
 |i,U0
h|i) is greater than (U ,Uh).
Using the qualitative properties of the solution to the ﬁrst and second stage problems, I
can express the incentive compatibility constraint as
(1 − σ + η(U0
j)) · πj(U0
j) ≥ (1 − σ + η(U0
−j)) · ˜ π−j(U0
−j),














Notice that, if the seller realizes the production cost c−i but announces ci, its expected proﬁts
per customer ˜ πi(U) are generally diﬀerent from π−i(U). First, when the seller misreports its
type, the customers’ expectations about the value of the match are not correct. In particular,
while the customers expect to receive the continuation value U0
i|i with probability ρ and U0
−i|i
with probability 1 − ρ, the seller oﬀers them U0
i|i af r a c t i o n1 − ρ o ft h et i m ea n dU0
−i|i a
fraction ρ of the time. Secondly, when the seller misreports its type, the continuation values
U0
 |i and U0
h|i prescribed by the second-best schedule are not its preferred way to allocate the
customers’ lifetime utility over time and across states.
Only when costs are i.i.d., ˜ πi(U) is equal to π−i(U). In this case, a seller that realizes
the cost of production cj correctly reports its type if it attains higher proﬁts by oﬀering to
its customers the lifetime utility U0
j rather than U0
−j, i.e.
(1 − σ + η(U0
j)) · πj(U0





  are both greater than Uh, a seller that realizes the cost of production ch
announces its true type if and only if U0
h is smaller than U0
 .S i n c eU0
  is greater than U  but
U0
h need not be greater than U , a seller that realizes the cost of production c  announces
i t st r u et y p ei fe i t h e rU0
h is greater than U0
  or suﬃciently smaller than the proﬁt-maximizing
value U . The set of continuation values (U0
 ,U0
h) that induces both seller’s types to report
their actual costs is illustrated in Figure 1.
15 








Ul  Uh 
j=l 
j=h 
Given the characterization of the incentive compatibility constraint (13), I can conclude
that there exist two candidate solutions to the second-stage problem. The ﬁrst solution
prescribes that the continuation value oﬀered to the customers should be independent from
the seller’s announcement about its cost of production, i.e. U0
h = U0
  = U0, and such that the





2 [η0(U0) · πj (U0) − 1 − σ + η(U0)]. (14)
The second solution prescribes that the continuation value should be lower when the cost of
production announced by the seller is higher, i.e. U0
h <U 0
 ,a n dt h a tU0
h should be suﬃciently
far below U  to induce the low-cost seller to truthfully report its type. When productivity
shocks are small, the state-independent solution is optimal because it closely approximates
the ﬁrst-best (U0∗
  ,U0∗
h ) while the state-contingent solution approximates the no commitment
outcome (U ,Uh). This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (Rigid Prices) Let c  = c − ∆ and ch = c + ∆ for some c ∈ (0,u− z).
When the seller’s cost of production is privately observed and i.i.d. over time, there exists a
∆∗ > 0 such that, for all ∆ ∈ (0,∆∗), the optimal price schedule {p(ˆ ct)}∞
t=0 prescribes the
price p(ˆ ct)=u − U0 + β[(1 − σ)U0 + σZ] for all dates t ≥ 1 and all histories ˆ ct.
4.4 Moderately Persistent Costs: Sticky Prices
In this subsection, I characterize the optimal price schedule under asymmetric information
when production costs are positively correlated over time, but not to the point where the
16ﬁrst-best schedule becomes feasible. In order to develop the analysis, I ﬁnd convenient
to ﬁrst solve a version of the second-stage problem (11) that abstracts from the incentive
compatibility constraint for the high-cost seller and to later verify that the constraint is
satisﬁed.
Let the persistence ρ of production costs be anywhere in the interval (0,ρ ∗).T h er e l a x e d
version of the second-stage problem in (11) is











(1 − σ + η(U0
 )) · π  (U0
 ) ≥ (1 − σ + η(U0
h)) · e πh (U0
h).
(15)
Consider the incentive compatibility constraint for the low-cost seller. On the one hand,
the seller’s proﬁts from truthfully reporting its type are monotonically decreasing with the
continuation value U0
  promised to its customers. On the other hand, the seller’s proﬁts
from misreporting its type are ﬁrst increasing and then decreasing in the continuation value
U0
h expected by the customers and they are maximized at ˜ Uh ∈ [Z,U ].M o r e o v e r , w h e n
U0
  = U0
h, the seller makes higher proﬁts by correctly reporting its type rather than lying.
Therefore, the incentive compatibility constraint is satisﬁed either when U0
h is not much
smaller than the alternative continuation value U0
  or when U0
h is suﬃciently far below the
proﬁt-maximizing value ˜ Uh. The set of incentive-compatible continuation values is illustrated
in Figure 2.
 











   U-h  Uh 
17When ρ<ρ ∗,t h eﬁrst-best solution (U0∗
  ,U0∗
h ) to the second-stage problem does not sat-
isfy the low-cost seller’s incentive compatibility constraint. The second-best solution distorts
the continuation values (U0
 ,U0
h) away from (U0∗
  ,U0∗
h ) in order to make the low-cost seller in-
diﬀerent between correctly reporting its type and lying. More speciﬁcally, when productivity
shocks are small, the second-best solution distorts the continuation value U0
  downward and
U0
h upward. And, if in the previous period the seller has reported the low cost of production,
then U0
  is distorted less and U0
h is distorted more than if the seller had reported ch.O v e r -
all, the second-best continuation values (U0
 |i,U0
h|i) are such that U0∗
h ≤ U0
h|i <U 0
 |i ≤ U0∗
 |i,
U0
 |  >U 0
 |h and U0
h|h <U 0
h| .
Now, I am in the position to recover the structure of the second-best price schedule
p = {p(b ct)}∞
t=0.I n p e r i o d t =0 , the seller enters the market with no prior obligations,
U(c0)=Z,a n dt h ep r o d u c t i o nc o s tci. The seller oﬀers its customers the proﬁt-maximizing
lifetime utility Ui by setting the current period’s price to pi(Ui) a n dc o m m i t t i n gt ot h e
continuation values (U0
 |i,U0
h|i),w h e r e
pi(U)=u − U + β
P
j Pr(cj|ci)[(1− σ)U0
j|i + σZ]. (16)
In period t ≥ 1 and after the public history ˆ ct−1 = {ˆ ct−2,c i} has been realized, the seller
reports its actual production cost cj and oﬀers its customers the promised lifetime utility U0
j|i
by setting the current period’s price to pj(U0




From the properties of the continuation values U0
j|i, I can characterize the joint dynamics
of costs and prices. First, “steady-state” prices are increasing in the production cost. That is,
if the seller realizes the production cost c  for a suﬃciently long period of time, it charges the
price p (U0
 | ) which is strictly lower than the price ph(U0
h|h) it would have charged if it had
realized ch instead. Secondly, prices are “sticky.” That is, when the seller ﬁrst realizes the
high production cost, it charges a price ph(U0
h| ) which is strictly lower than the steady-state
level ph(U0
h|h). Conversely, when the seller ﬁrst realizes the low production cost, it charges a
price p (U0
 |h) which is strictly greater than p (U0
 | ).
Proposition 4: (Sticky Prices) Let c  = c−∆ and ch = c+∆ for some c ∈ (0,u− z) and
suppose that the solution to the Bellman equation (BE2) is unique. Then, when the seller’s
cost of production is privately observed and persistent (ρ>1/2), there exists a ∆∗ > 0
such that, for all ∆ ∈ (0,∆∗), the optimal price schedule {p(ˆ ct)}∞
t=0 prescribes the price
p(c0)=pi(Ui) for c0 = ci and the price p(ˆ ct)=pj(U0
i|j) for t ≥ 1 and ct = {ct−2,c i,c j}.






1 ,c h,c h} and ct
2 = {c
t−2
2 ,c  ,c  }. The prescribed price adjusts
18slowly over time in response to a change in the reported cost of production: p(ct+1) >p (ct)
for ct+1 = {ct−2,c  ,c h,c h} and p(ct+1) <p (ct) for ct+1 = {ct−2,c h,c  ,c  }.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper, I have built a model marketplace populated by a ﬁnite number of sellers–each
producing its own variety of the good–and a continuum of buyers–each searching for a
variety he likes. Using the model, I have studied the response of a seller’s price to privately
observed ﬂuctuations in its idiosyncratic production cost. I have found that the qualitative
properties of this response critically depend on the persistence of the production cost. In
particular, if the cost is i.i.d., the seller’s price does not respond at all. If the cost is somewhat
persistent, the seller’s price responds slowly and incompletely. If the cost is very persistent,
the seller’s price adjusts instantaneously and eﬃciently to all ﬂuctuations in productivity. I
have argued that these ﬁndings can explain why the monthly frequency of a price change is
so much lower for processed than for raw goods.
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AA p p e n d i x
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Claim 1: After any history ct, the optimal price schedule p is such that U(ct|p) ≥ Z.
Proof: On the way to a contradiction, let ct
1 be the earlier history at which U(ct
1|p) ≥ Z.
Then, if the history ct
1 is realized (an event which occurs with positive probability), the seller
20loses all its current customers and can’t attract any any new customers in the future. Its
expected discounted proﬁts are equal to zero. Now, consider an alternative schedule b p such
that b p(cτ)=p(cτ) if cτ is not a subsequent of ct
1 and b p(cτ)=u − z>0 otherwise. For all
τ<t ,the seller’s periodical proﬁts are the same with b p and p because prices and customers
are the same. Similarly, for all ct 6= ct
1, the seller’s continuation proﬁts are the same with b p
and p.F i n a l l yf o rct = ct
1, the continuation proﬁts are strictly positive. Overall, in period
t =0 , the seller strictly prefers to commit to the schedule b p that p, which contradicts the
optimality of the latter. k
Denote with Πi(U) the value function associated to the sequence problem (SP1) when
c0 = ci,n (c0)=1and U(c0) is constrained to be g r e a t e ro re q u a lthan U. Denote with Π
+
i (U)
the value function associated to (SP1) when c0 = ci,n (c0)=1and U(c0) is constrained to
be equal to U.
Claim 2: The value functions Πi(U) and Π
+
i (U) are such that
Πi(U)= m a x
V,p,U0
j≥Z
(1 − σ + η(V ))
h

















Proof: Making use of Claim 1, I can write the value function Πi (U) as











n(c1) [p(ct) − ct]
ii
U ≤ U(c0) ≡ u − p(c0)+β
P
j Pr(cj|ci)[(1− σ)U({c0,c j})+σZ],











n(c1)(1 − σ + η(U(ct))).
The maximization problem above can be broken down in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage,
the seller chooses p(c0),U(c0) and U({c0,c j}) subject to the ﬁrst and third constraints. In
the second stage, the seller chooses p1 = {p(ct)}
∞
t=1 in order to maximize its continuation
proﬁts subject to delivering exactly U({c0,c j}) to the customers and given an initial cost






=1 . Therefore, the value
function associated to the second-stage problem is Π
+
j (U({c0,c j})). k
Claim 3: The function Πi (U) satisﬁes the Bellman equation (BE1).
Proof: First, notice that the solution to the maximization problem in (A1) is a continuation
value U
+
j that belongs to the set UPF
j = {U : Π
+
j (U)=Πj(U)}, i.e. the set of continuation
21values U such that the seller could not increase its proﬁts by delivering more than U. There-
fore, I can restrict attention to continuation values in UPF
j and replace Π
+
j (U) with Πj(U)
in (A1). Secondly, notice that, if the continuation function in (A1) is Πj(U) and the choice
of continuation values is not restricted to UPF
j , the solution to the maximization problem is
U0
j ∈ UPF
j . Therefore, I can relax the choice set and obtain (BE1). k
Claim 4: If Pi (U) is a solution to the functional equation (BE1),t h e nPi (U) is equal to
Πi (U).
Proof: Denote with T the mapping associated to (BE1). It is immediate to verify that T
satisﬁes the Blackwell’s suﬃcient conditions for a contraction mapping. Therefore, T has a
unique ﬁxed point. k
To conclude the proof of Lemma 1, notice that the value function associated to the
sequence problem (SP1) when c0 = ci and n(c0) > 0 is given by n(c0) · Πi(0).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Consider the ﬁrst-stage problem in (4). For V< Z , the objective function (1 − σ + η(V )) ·
πi(V ) is equal to zero because η(V )=σ − 1. For V = Z, the function is strictly positive
because η(V )=0and, as proved in Lemma 1, πi(Z) > 0.F o rV ≥ Z, the function is quasi-
concave because it is concave wherever increasing and may be convex only when strictly
decreasing. The function attains its maximum for V = Ui, where Ui satisﬁes
[η0(Ui) · πi(Ui) − (1 − σ + η(Ui))] · (Ui − Z)=0 .( A 2 )
From the properties of the objective function, it follows that the solution Vi(U) to the ﬁrst-
stage problem is Ui whenever U ≤ U and U otherwise. In turn, the value function Πi(U)
associated to the ﬁrst-stage problem is constant at (1−σ +η(Ui))·π(Ui) whenever U ≤ Ui
and is strictly decreasing and quasi-concave otherwise.
Next, consider the second-stage problem in (4). As proved in Lemma 1, the choice set can
be restricted to those continuation values that are greater than the proﬁt-maximizing values







j) − (1 − σ + η(U0
j)) = −(1 − σ). (A3)
22Because η0πj −(1−σ +η) is non-negative for all U ≤ Uj, the optimal continuation value U0
j
is strictly greater than the proﬁt-maximizing value Uj.
Finally, I want to compare the solution to the ﬁrst and second stage problem under
high and low cost of production. Denote with T the contraction mapping associated to the
Bellman equation (BE1). Since (TP)h < (TP)  whenever Ph ≤ P , the unique ﬁxed point
Π of the contraction mapping T associated to the Bellman equation (BE1) is such that the
proﬁt function is strictly decreasing in the cost of production. I nt u r n ,t h i si m p l i e st h a t




A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Claim 1: After any history b ct, the optimal price schedule p is such that U (b ct|p) ≥ Z.
Proof: Suppose that, at b ct
1, the optimal schedule p is such that the buyers’ lifetime utility
U (b ct|p) is strictly smaller than Z and, consequently, the seller’s expected proﬁts are zero.
Consider the alternative schedule b p which prescribes the constant price b p(b cτ)=u − z for
all histories b cτ that are subsequents of b ct
1.A t b ct
1, the alternative schedule b p is such that
the buyers’ lifetime utility U (b ct|b p) is equal to Z and the seller’s expected proﬁts are strictly
positive. The schedule b p satisﬁes the incentive-compatibility constraint (IC). If it is also
renegotiation-proof, then b p is a feasible Pareto improvement over p after the history b ct
1 is
realized. Therefore, p violates the constraint (RP) and is not an optimum. If b p is not
renegotiation-proof, then there exists a feasible schedule ˜ p which is a Pareto improvement
over b p and, a fortiori, over p. Again, p violates the constraint (RP) and is not an optimum.
k
Denote with Πi (U) the value function associated to (SP2) when c0 = ci,n (c0)=1and
U(c0) is constrained to be greater or equal than U. Denote with Π
+
i (U) the value function
associated to (SP2) when c0 = ci,n (c0)=1and U(c0) is constrained to be equal to U.
Finally, let UPF be the set of promised values U such that the seller could not increase its
proﬁts by delivering more than U, i.e. UPF
i = {U : Π
+
i (U)=Πi(U)}.
Claim 2: The value function Π
+
i (U) satisﬁes the Bellman equation
Π
+




(1 − σ + η(U))
h








































Moreover, the value functions Πi(U) and Π
+
i (U) satisfy the functional equation




(1 − σ + η(V ))
h
























Proof: The proof of this claim follows directly from the analysis of the seller’s problem in
Section 4.1. k
Claim 3: The function Πi (U) satisﬁes the Bellman equation (BE2).
Proof: The continuation value U0
j that solves the maximization problem in (A5) belongs to
the set UPF
j . For all U ∈ UPF
j , the proﬁt function Π
+
j (U) is equal to Πj(U) and the function
˜ Π
+
j (U) is equal to ˜ Πj(U),w h e r e˜ Πj(U) is deﬁned in (BE2). Therefore, I can replace the
continuation proﬁt Π
+
j (U) with Πj(U) in the objective function of (A5) and substitute the
incentive compatibility constraint Π
+
j (U0




j) ≥ ˜ Π−j(U0
−j).M o r e o v e r ,
if the constraint U0
j ∈ UPF is removed from the modiﬁed problem, the optimal continuation
value U0
j belongs to UPF
j . Therefore, I can also substitute the constraint U0
j ∈ UPF
j with the
constraint Uj ≥ Z. k
To conclude the proof of Lemma 2, notice that the value function associated to the
sequence problem (SP2) when c0 = ci and n(c0) > 0 is given by n(c0) · Πi(0).
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
For ˆ ct−1 = ct−1 and ct = ch,t h eﬁrst-best schedule satisﬁes the incentive compatibility
constraint (IC) if and only if
(1 − σ)[1− β (1 − σ + η(U0
 ))(2ρ − 1)] + η0(U0
  − U0
h) ≥ 0.
The ﬁr s tt e r mo nt h eL H Si sp o s i t i v eb e c a u s eβ (1 − σ + η(U)) is strictly smaller than 1.
The second term on the LHS is positive because U0
  is strictly greater than U0
h. Therefore,
the incentive compatibility constraint is satisﬁed.
24For ˆ ct−1 = ct−1 and ct = ch,t h eﬁrst-best schedule satisﬁes the incentive compatibility
constraint (IC) if and only if
η0(U0
  − U0
h) − (1 − σ)[1− β (1 − σ + η(U0
h))(2ρ − 1)] ≥ 0.












+( 1− σ)β2(1 − σ + η(U0
h)).
If dU0
 /dρ > 0 and dU0
h/dρ < 0, the derivative is strictly positive and, hence, there exists a
critical level of persistence ρ∗ ∈ [1/2,1] such that the incentive compatibility constraint is
satisﬁed when and only when ρ ≥ ρ∗.
In order to identify the sign of dU0
i/dρ,i ti sc o n v e n i e n tt ol e tPi(U ,U h;ρ) denote the
proﬁts of a seller that has realized the production cost ci and has committed to providing its
customers with the lifetime utility U  whenever ct = c  and with Uh whenever ct = ch, i.e.
Pi(U ,U h;ρ)=( 1− σ + η(Ui))[pi − ci + βρPi + β(1 − ρ)P−i]
pi(U ,U h;ρ)=u − Ui + βσZ + β(1 − σ)[ρUi +( 1− ρ)U−i].
For a generic couple (U ,U h), Pi is smaller than the value function Πi.F o r(U ,U h) equal to
the optimal continuation values (U0
 ,U0
h), Pi is equal to Πi.T h ed e r i v a t i v eo fPi with respect
to the persistence of the cost of production is given by
∂Pi
∂ρ
= ∆−1β [(1 − σ)(Ui − U−i)+( Pi − P−i)],
where ∆ is a positive constant. When evaluated at (U0
 ,U0
h), ∂P /∂ρ is strictly positive and
∂Ph/∂ρ is strictly negative because U0
  >U 0
h and P  = Π  > Πh = Ph.
The value function πi(V ;ρ) associated to the second-stage problem in (4) is equal to
πi(V ;ρ)=u − ci − V + βσZ + β max
U ,Uh
P
j Pr(cj|ci)[Pj(U ,U h;ρ)+( 1− σ)Uj]






















From the second line, it follows that ∂π /∂ρ is strictly positive and ∂πh/∂ρ is strictly negative.
In turn, from the ﬁrst order condition (6) for the continuation value, it follows that dU0
 /dρ
is strictly positive and dU0
h/dρ is strictly negative.
25A.5 Preliminaries to Propositions 3 and 4
Consider the ﬁrst-stage problem in (11). For V< Z , the objective function (1 − σ + η(V ))·
πi(V ) is equal to zero because η(V )=σ − 1. For V = Z, the function is strictly positive
because 1+σ = η(V )=1− σ>0 and πi(Z) > 0 as proved in Lemma 2. For V ≥ Z,t h e
function is quasi-concave. The function attains its maximum for V = Ui, where Ui is the
solution to equation (A2). From the properties of the objective function, it follows that the
solution Vi(U) to the ﬁrst-stage problem is Ui whenever U ≤ Ui and U otherwise. In turn, the
value function Πi(U) associated to the ﬁrst-stage problem is constant at (1−σ+η(Ui))·π(Ui)
whenever U ≤ Ui and is strictly decreasing and quasi-concave otherwise.
Next, consider the second-stage problem in (11). As proved in Lemma 2, the choice set can
be restricted to the continuation values (U0
 ,U0
h) that are greater than the proﬁt-maximizing
values (U ,Uh). Over this domain, the objective function is jointly quasi concave in (U0
 ,U0
h).
Also, for any given U0
h, the objective function is maximized at U0∗
  ,w h e r eU0∗
  is the solution
to equation (A3) for j =   and is strictly greater than U . For any given U0
 , the objective
function is maximized at U0∗
h ,w h e r eU0∗
h is the solution to equation (A3) for j = h and is
strictly greater than Uh. The choice of the continuation values is limited by the incentive
compatibility constraint Πj(U0
j) ≥ e Π−j(U0
−j).S i n c eV enters separately from (U0
 ,U0
h) in the
objective function and does not enter the constraints, the solution U0
j|i(V ) to the second-stage
problem is independent from V and can be denoted with U0
j|i.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 3
When ρ =1 /2, the second-stage problem in (12) can be reformulated as














(1 − σ + η(U0
j)) · πj(U0




h ≥ Uh, U0
  ≥ U  ≥ Uh and the function (1 − σ + η) · πh is strictly decreasing for all
U ≥ Uh, the high-cost seller’s incentive compatibility constraint (A6) is equivalent to U0
  ≥
U0
h. Since the function (1 − σ + η) · π  is strictly increasing for U ∈ [Uh,U ] and strictly
decreasing for U ≥ U , the low-cost seller’s incentive compatibility constraint (A6) is satisﬁed
either if U0
h ≥ U0
  or if U0
h is suﬃciently lower than U . Overall, a couple of continuation
values (U0
 ,U0
h) is feasible if either U0
  = U0
h ≥ U  or U0
  6= U0
h and U0
h ≤ U ,U 0
  ≥ U .
Let c  (∆)=c−∆ and ch (∆)=c+∆ for some c ∈ (0,u−z) and ∆ ≥ 0. If the solution to
the second-stage problem is such that U0
  = U0
h, the seller’s proﬁts per customer are bounded
26below by
πP





  (∆);∆)+( 1− σ)U0∗
  (∆)].
If the solution to the second-stage problem is such that U0
  6= U0
h, the seller’s proﬁts per
customer are bounded above by
πS












h (∆)=m i n {U0∗
h (∆),U (∆)} and US
  (∆)=U0∗
  (∆). Independently from the nature
of the solution to the second-stage problem, the seller’s proﬁts per customer are bounded
above by
πP











For ∆ =0 ,π P
i (V ;∆) is equal to π∗
i(U;∆) because Π (U;∆)=Πh(U;∆) and U0∗
  (∆)=
U0∗
h (∆).F o r∆ =0 ,π S
i (U;∆) is strictly smaller than to π∗
i(U;∆) because US
h (∆)=Uh(∆)
and Uh(∆) <U 0∗
h (∆). By continuity, I conclude that the solution to the second-stage problem
is such that U0
  = U0
h for all ∆ ∈ (0,∆∗).
A.7 Proof of Proposition 4
In order to characterize the second-best price schedule when productivity shocks are per-
sistent, I start by conjecturing that the solution to the problem (SP2) is such that: (i) the
high-cost seller’s incentive compatibility constraint is moot, i.e. Πh(U0
h|i) > ˜ Π (U0
 |i) for
i =  ,h; (ii) the low-cost seller prefers to report its true type rather than lying whenever
U0
  = U0
h = U, i.e. π (U) ≥ e πh(U).
If the high-cost seller’s incentive compatibility constraint is moot, the second-stage prob-
lem in (12) can be reformulated as











(1 − σ + η(U0
 )) · π  (U0
 ) ≥ (1 − σ + η(U0
h)) · e πh (U0
h).( A 7 )
For all U0
  ≥ U , the LHS of (A7) is strictly decreasing. For all U0
h ≥ Uh, the RHS of (A7)
is quasi-concave because it is concave whenever increasing and convex only when strictly
decreasing. The RHS attains its maximum for U0
h = e Uh ≤ U ,w h e r ee Uh satisﬁes
h
η0(e Uh) · e πh(e Uh) − (1 − σ + η(e Uh))
i
· (e Uh − Z)=0 .
27It is useful to partition the feasible set of the second-stage problem into the subsets P
and S. Speciﬁcally, P is the set of continuation values (U0
 ,U0
h) that are feasible and such
that U0
h ≥ e Uh, while S is the set of continuation values that are feasible and such that
U0
h ≤ e Uh.T h e s e t P contains the state-independent continuation values U0
  = U0
h ≥ U 




h is greater than U  because e Uh ≤ U .
Let c  (∆)=c −∆ and ch (∆)=c +∆ for some c ∈ (0,u−z) and ∆ ≥ 0. If the solution
to the second-stage problem belongs to the subset P, the seller’s proﬁts per customer are
bounded below by
πP
i (V ;∆)=u − ci (∆) − V + βσZ + β
P
j Pr(cj|ci)[Πj (U0∗
  (∆);∆)+( 1− σ)U0∗
  (∆)].
If the solution to the second-stage problem belongs to the subset S, the seller’s proﬁts per
customer are bounded above by
πS










h (∆)=m i n {U0∗
h (∆),U (∆)} and US
  (∆)=U0∗
  (∆). Independently from the nature
of the solution to the second-stage problem, the seller’s proﬁts per customer are bounded
above by
πP









For ∆ =0 ,π P
i (V ;∆) is equal to π∗
i(U;∆) because Π (U;∆)=Πh(U;∆) and U0∗
  (∆)=
U0∗
h (∆).F o r∆ =0 ,π S
i (U;∆) is strictly smaller than to π∗
i(U;∆) because US
h (∆)=Uh(∆)
and Uh(∆) <U 0∗
h (∆). By continuity, I conclude that the solution to the second-stage problem
belongs to P for all ∆ ∈ (0,∆1).
When ∆ is suﬃciently small, i.e. ∆ ∈ (0,∆2), the unconstrained maximum of the second-
stage problem (U0∗
  ,U0∗
h ) is not feasible because it violates the low-cost seller’s incentive
compatibility constraint (cf. condition (10)). When this is the case, the constraint (A7) holds
with equality because the objective function of the second-stage problem is quasi concave.
Therefore, for all ∆ ∈ (0,∆∗),w h e r e∆∗ =m i n {∆1,∆2}, the solution to the second-stage
problem belongs to the subset P and satisﬁes the constraint (A7) with equality.
For all ∆ ∈ (0,∆∗),t h es o l u t i o n(U0
 |i,U0
h|i) to the second-stage problem has the following
properties:
1. The continuation value U0
 |i is smaller than U0∗
  .P r o o f :I fU0
 |i is strictly greater than
U0∗
  ,t h e n( U0∗
  ,U0
h|i) is feasible because Π (U0∗
  ) > Π (U0
 |i).A l s o ,( U0∗
  ,U0
h|i) is prefer-
able because the objective function is quasi concave in U0
  and is maximized at U0∗
  .
282. The continuation value U0
h|i is greater than U0∗
h .P r o o f :I f U0
h|i is strictly smaller
than U0∗
h ,t h e n( U0
 |i,U0∗
h ) is feasible because ˜ Πh(U0∗
h ) < ˜ Πh(U0
h|i).A l s o , ( U0
 |i,U0∗
h )i s
preferable because the objective function is quasi concave in U0
h and is maximized at
U0∗
h .
3. The continuation value U0
h|i is strictly smaller than U0
 |i.P r o o f :I fU0
h|i is greater than
U0
 |i,t h e nΠ (U0
 |i) ≥ ˜ Πh(U0
 |i) > ˜ Πh(U0
h|i). This is not possible because (A7) holds




 |j is strictly greater than U0
 |i.P r o o f :S i n c et h e LHS and RHS of
(A7) are strictly decreasing in U0
  and U0




 |j >U 0
 |i.
5. The continuation values are such that U0
 |  ≥ U0
 |h and U0
h|  ≥ U0
h|h.P r o o f :S i n c e
the objective function puts more weight on Π (U0
 )+( 1− σ)U0
  and less weight on
Πh(U0
h)+(1− σ)U0
h when ci = c  than when ci = ch, Π (U0
 | )+(1− σ)U0
 |  is greater
than Π (U0
 |h)+( 1− σ)U0
 |h. In light of property (1), this implies that U0
 |  is greater
than U0
 |h. In light of property (2), this implies that U0
h|  is greater than U0
h|h.






is greater for k = i
than −i. Proof: This result follows immediately from property (5).
These six properties of the optimal continuation values lead immediately to Proposition 4.
In the last step of the analysis, I have to verify my initial conjectures. In order to
verify that the high-cost seller’s incentive compatibility constraint is moot, it is convenient
to rewrite Πh(U0




 |i) · πh(U0
h|i) ≥







 |i + β (1 − σ)(2ρ − 1)(U0





















First, notice that U0
h|i ≥ U0∗
h implies that η0πh(U0
h|i) is smaller than η(U0
h|i) and that the
LHS of (A8) is bounded below by
(U0
h|i − U0
 |i) · η(U0
h|i).( A 9 )














h|h greater than U0
 |  −U0
h|  (a fact that can be derived from the low-cost seller’s
29incentive compatibility constraint) imply that the RHS of (A8) is bounded above by both





 |i + β (1 − σ)(2ρ − 1)(U0









 |i + β (1 − σ)(2ρ − 1)(U0





Overall, the high-cost seller’s incentive constraint (A8) is satisﬁed if (A9) is greater than
(A10) or, equivalently, if
(1 − σ)
h




 |i − U0
h|i) ≥ 0. (A11)
Because β(1 − σ + η(U0
h|i)) is smaller than 1 and U0
 |i is greater than U0
h|i,t h es u ﬃcient
condition (A11) is satisﬁed.
Finally, I have to verify the conjecture that the low-cost seller prefers to report its true
type rather than lying whenever U0
  = U0





















j| )+( 1− σ)U0
j| |c 
i








is smaller than U0
 |h, condition (A12) is satisﬁed.
30